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Imagine, if you will, the following facts: During a period of congressio-
nally authorized hostilities against a foreign state, Captain South, a United
States naval officer, receives a Presidential order to seize certain vessels
found trading with the enemy. The order itself is not authorized by Con-
gress, but neither is it expressly prohibited: the law is silent concerning the
President's authority to issue the order. Captain South carries out the Pres-
ident's order, and the owners of the seized vessel bring an action in damages
against him protesting the seizure. The theory of the suit: the President's
order, not having been authorized by Congress, is illegal. And the main
question: Should Captain South be held personally liable for damages?
For several reasons, one's immediate reaction might be to answer in
the negative. First, one might be inclined to agree with Lewis A. Tambs,
former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica. Tambs testified to Congress that
he was ordered by Lt. Col. Oliver North to open a new military front in
southern Nicaragua.1 The order may well have violated the law-the so-
called Boland Amendment 2 -which Tambs testified he had never read.3
The Ambassador said:
The people in the field who are trying to do a job are going to assume that
orders from Washington are legal and legitimate. I certainly do not want to
see the United States government brought to paralysis while people are get-
ting private legal counsel before they carry out orders from their legitimate
superiors.4
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1. N.Y. Times, May 30, 1987, at A8, col. 3.
2. The "Boland Amendment" is actually a series of several amendments to appropriations
and authorization acts enacted by Congress between 1982 and 1986. These amendments re-
strict or outrightly bar the use of funds by the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA, and
other intelligence entities of the U.S. government for military or paramilitary operations in
Nicaragua. For a chart of the unclassified "Boland Amendments," see 133 CONG. REC.
H4982-87 (daily ed. June 15, 1987).
3. N.Y. Times, May 30, 1987, at A8, col. 3.
4. Id.
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One might further argue that it is hardly practicable to have a lawyer
aboard every naval vessel, and that, consequently, naval officers ought
not be penalized for assuming executive orders to be legal. Captain
South might do well to rely upon the immortal guidance of Fawn Hall:
"I did as I was told." 5
Second, one might think that this is a foreign relations controversy to
be left for the political branches to work out, and not one for the courts
to decide.6
Third, one might contend that the order at issue is not at all unlawful.
According to this argument, the order did not contravene the will of
Congress since Congress did not prohibit it-Congress merely failed to
authorize it.7
Finally, one might respond that the President's enumerated constitu-
tional power as commander-in-chief of the armed forces" permits him to
order the seizure of foreign vessels. Under this view, to the extent that a
congressional enactment precludes the President from ordering such a
seizure, it might be regarded as unconstitutional. 9
In fact, the dispute sketched out above is not at all hypothetical. It
occurred-in 1799. And it was adjudicated. The case: Little v. Bar-
reme.10 The author of the opinion: Chief Justice John Marshall. The
decision: judgment for the plaintiff ship owners, affirmed by a unani-
mous United States Supreme Court."1
The facts were fairly simple. During the administration of President
John Adams, the United States fought an undeclared naval war with
France.12 Although the war itself was not declared, Congress did enact
statutory restrictions on commerce and navigation with France, and pro-
hibited American vessels from sailing to French ports.13 Congress also
enacted the means to carry out those restrictions. Specifically, it author-
ized the President to order U.S. naval officers (a) to stop any American
5. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1987, at A15, col. 4.
6. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
7. See generally Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congres-
sional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J 515 (1982) (where constitutional text is vague,
congressional inaction would not necessarily constitute prohibition of executive action).
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
9. See, e.g., T. FRANCK & M. GLENNON, UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW:
DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES 125-28 (1981) (War Powers Resolution vetoed by President
Nixon as unconstitutional imposition on his power as commander-in-chief).
10. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
11. Id. at 179.
12. Id. at 173, 177; see also H. BLUMENTHAL, FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES: THEIR
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP 1789-1914, at 13-17 (1970); D. MCKAY, THE UNITED STATES
AND FRANCE 81-83 (1951).
13. Non-Intercourse Act, ch. 2, § 1, 3 Stat. 613 (1799) (expired 1800).
Vol. 13:5, 1988
Presidential Foreign Affairs Power
ship if there existed reason to suspect the ship to be bound for a French
port, 14 and (b) to seize the ship if, upon searching it, it appeared to be so
bound. 15 Congress further provided that the captured ship be con-
demned and, rather generously, that the proceeds be shared between the
United States and the person initiating the seizure, presumably the war-
ship's captain.1 6
When the Secretary of the Navy issued orders a month after the law
was enacted, he included a copy of the law along with the orders, which
incorporated it by reference. 17 One recipient of those orders was Captain
George Little, commander of the U.S. frigate Boston. Unknown to Lit-
tle, however, the orders departed from the law in two key respects. First,
they directed the seizure not only of ships that were clearly American,
but also of ships that appeared to be foreign but might really be Ameri-
can or even merely carrying American cargo.18 Second, they directed the
seizure not only of ships bound to French ports, but also of those sailing
-from French ports. 19 The order therefore expanded Little's authority,
and the United States' risk of involvement in hostilities, significantly be-
yond what Congress had contemplated.
Pursuant to his instructions, Little seized the Flying Fish, a vessel car-
rying Danish papers and sailing from a French port, and sought to have
her condemned. 20 The central issue in the condemnation proceedings
was not whether the Flying Fish should be condemned; Marshall agreed
with the courts below that the seizure of a neutral vessel was unlawful.21
Rather, the issue was whether the Danish owners of the Flying Fish
should be awarded damages for the injuries they suffered.22 Little's de-
fense was that he merely followed orders, and that those orders excused
him from liability.23 Because the Flying Fish fell squarely within the
class of ships that the President had ordered seized, the Supreme Court
had to consider whether the President's orders immunized his officer per-




17. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 171, 178.
18. Id. at 171.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 176. Little had some reason to suspect the Flying Fish's true nationality:
"[D]uring the chase by the American frigates, the [Flying Fish's] master threw overboard the
logbook, and certain other papers." Id. at 173 (emphasis in original).
21. Id. at 172, 175-76.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 178-79.
24. Id.
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The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment awarding
damages to the ship's owners.25 Marshall's first reaction, he confesses in
the opinion, was that, given Little's orders, a judgment against him for
damages would be improper. It is "indispensably necessary to every mil-
itary system," Marshall writes, that "military men usually pay implicit
obedience... to the orders of their superiors. ' 26 He changed his mind,
however, when he considered the character of Little's act: it stood in
direct contravention of the will of Congress. "[T]he legislature seems to
have prescribed the manner in which this law shall be carried into execu-
tion," and in so doing "exclude[d] a seizure of any vessel not bound to a
French port."' 27 Under the law enacted by Congress, therefore, Little
"would not have been authorized to detain" the Flying Fish.28 "[Tihe
instructions [from the Secretary of the Navy]," Marshall concludes,
"cannot change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which
without those instructions would have been a plain trespass. ' 29 Marshall
thus forthrightly rejects the so-called "good soldier" defense: it is of no
consequence that Little was merely following orders.30
25. Id. at 179.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 177-78.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 179.
30. It is most extraordinary that the "good soldier" defense should have been addressed
and disposed of by no less than John Marshall. The Chief Justice's finding that no executive
immunity exists apparently had no statutory or common law basis. In fact, in a later opinion,
Osborne v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), Marshall implied that a
certain amount of executive immunity was required by the Constitution. While acknowledg-
ing that executive branch immunity from civil suits is not explicitly granted by the Constitu-
tion, Marshall held in Osborne that because of the faithful execution clause, immunity may be
impliedly granted by Congress in statutes creating public agencies. Id. at 865-66; accord
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748-49 n.27 (1981) ("[T]he President is absolutely immune
from civil damages liability for his official acts in the absence of explicit affirmative action by
Congress."). Modern Supreme Court opinions find executive immunity required by the "in-
herent" or "'structural' assumptions of our scheme of government." Id. at 748 n.26; see also
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-10 (1978). Congress has never expressly granted nor
limited presidential immunity, nor is it clear that it has the power to do so. Nixon v. Fitzger-
ald, 457 U.S. at 748 n.27.
In Little, Marshall's distinction between lawful and unlawful orders was not supported by
the statutes in force at the time the cause of action arose. On March 2, 1799, when Little was
given his orders, a recently enacted law read: "Any officer.., who shall disobey the orders of
his superior... on any pretence [sic] whatsoever, shall suffer death, or such other punishment
as a court martial shall direct." Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 24, § 24, 1 Stat. 709, 711 (1799).
Also, the oath of office which Little took upon appointment to the Navy included the promise
"to observe and obey the orders of the President... and the orders of the officers appointed
over me." Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 3, 1 Stat. 95, 96 (1789). After the seizure of the
Flying Fish but before the decision in Little, the Act of 1799 was repealed. Under the new law,
military men could be penalized only for disobeying "lawful" orders. Act of Apr. 23, 1800, ch.
33, art. 14, 2 Stat. 45, 47 (1800). Thus, Little's paramount duty was to obey without question.
By disobeying even an unlawful order he would have risked execution. It is difficult to believe
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It is, in all, an extraordinary opinion-not only for what it says, but
also for what it does not say, on issues that might have provided Little
with a plausible defense: nonjusticiability of political matters, 31 ambigu-
ity of congressional intent,32 and infringement upon the President's "sole
organ" power.33
Marshall does not consider the possibility that the dispute might have
constituted a political issue unsuitable for judicial resolution. The great
Chief Justice well knew that such suits did exist, having written less than
a year before, in Marbury v. Madison,34 that "the President is invested
with certain important political powers" with respect to which "the deci-
sion of the executive is conclusive" and which, therefore, "can never be
examined by the courts."'35
Nor does Marshall address the argument that, absent some explicit
prohibition against actions such as Little's, the President's orders might
not be contrary to the will of Congress. Yet the problem of ascertaining
congressional intent in the face of congressional silence was not foreign
to Marshall. In the Little opinion itself, he considers the question
whether the President would have had the authority to issue Little's or-
ders had Congress remained completely silent on the issue. The Chief
Justice says he is not sure:
It is by no means clear that the president of the United States whose high
duty it is to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," and who is
commander in chief of the armies and navies of the United States, might
not, without any special authority for that purpose,... have empowered
the officers commanding the armed vessels of the United States, to seize...
American vessels... engaged in this illicit commerce.
36
that Marshall would impose his ruling knowing the consequences of disobeying illegal orders.
Yet, he cited none of these statutes in his opinion.
At common law no distinction existed between legal and illegal orders. The common law of
Great Britain was received into American law at Independence. These common law rules,
however, may have been superceded by later statutes. The British Military Code of 1715 re-
quired obedience to superior officers, with disobedience punishable by death. See Dunbar,
Some Aspects of the Problem of Superior Orders in the Law of War, 63 JURID. Rav. 234, 235
(1951). In 1749 the Code was revised to render a capital offense disobedience only of lawful
orders. Id. However, the American Acts of 1789 and 1799 superceded the British law. Thus,
Marshall could not rely on the common law to distinguish between legal and illegal orders.
31. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
34. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
35. Id. at 165. Eighty-seven years later, the Supreme Court cited Little as authority for
declining to find a political question. In Re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472 (1891), construed Little as
asserting that executive action, especially in matters dealing with persons and property, finds
little protection in the political question doctrine. Id. at 499-501.
36. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 177 (emphasis in original). Corwin suggests, wrongly, that
Marshall believed the President would have had the power to order such seizures in the ab-
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Thus, Marshall did not feel compelled in Little to define the limits of
presidential power in the face of congressional inaction. His decision in-
dicates that congressional authorization of a specified scope of executive
action is an implicit denial to the President of authority to order action
outside that scope. Marshall's understanding of congressional intent
thus sets a stage for direct confrontation between the executive and legis-
lative branches over foreign affairs, and on that stage he unfolds the cen-
tral meaning of his decision, and the proposition that gives it an abiding
timeliness: The will of Congress controls.
Finally, nowhere in Little does Marshall consider the possibility that
the President's order might have fallen within independent powers the
Executive might enjoy as "sole organ" of the United States in its foreign
relations. Yet it was none other than John Marshall, speaking only two
years earlier on the floor of the House of Representatives, who coined the
term. In the context of a debate as to whether President Adams had the
power to extradite to Britain an individual charged with murder, Mar-
shall declared: "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its exter-
nal relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. 37
Although we might imagine that such rhetoric, if taken seriously, would
lead Marshall to declare the statute to be an unconstitutional infringe-
ment of presidential powers, such an interpretation could not have been
further from Marshall's meaning. Far from arguing in his speech that
President Adams had an "inherent" or "independent" power to order
the extradition, Marshall in fact contended that it was Adams' duty
faithfully to execute the Jay Treaty,38 and that it was that Treaty, not the
President's exclusive constitutional power, that authorized and indeed
required the extradition in question.39 The truth is, therefore, that it
probably never occurred to John Marshall or to any of his colleagues in
1804 that the President, acting within the Constitution that many of
them had helped write, could disregard this congressional limitation.
That, most likely, is why Marshall's opinion in Little is silent on the
issue. The argument for a royal prerogative was not one with which
these Founding Fathers were unfamiliar: while they had not encoun-
sence of an implied statutory prohibition. See H. CHASE & C. DUCAT, CORWIN'S THE CON-
STITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 198 (14th ed. 1978).
37. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800). Marshall delivered his "sole organ" speech on
March 7, 1800.
38. Jay Treaty, Nov. 19, 1794, United States-United Kingdom, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105.
39. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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tered Oliver North, they had encountered his ideological if not genealogi-
cal ancestor, Lord North.4°
Marshall's opinion in Little is, therefore, one approach to the question
of the President's foreign affairs power. It views presidential power as
largely dependent upon the will of Congress. Very different is the extrav-
agant scheme concocted by Justice George Sutherland, first unveiled in
his earlier writings4 and later, in 1936, transposed into a Supreme Court
opinion and unleashed upon the nation in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp. 42 Congress had earlier enacted a very ordinary law making
certain arms sales illegal upon a finding by the President that a ban on
those sales would serve the cause of peace.43 President Roosevelt made
the finding, and defendant Curtiss-Wright violated the law.44 Curtiss-
Wright was indicted and convicted, and on appeal challenged the consti-
tutionality of the law on the ground that it violated the delegation
doctrine.45
Sutherland, speaking for the Court, says that the law is not "vulnera-
ble to attack under the rule that forbids a delegation of the law-making
power."'46 A law that would be invalid under the delegation doctrine if
directed at internal affairs, he suggests, is not necessarily invalid if di-
rected at external affairs.47
Sutherland's central rationale is that, in the field of foreign affairs, the
President exercises powers not set forth in the Constitution. The source
of those powers? "External sovereignty." "When... the external sover-
eignty of Great Britain in respect of the colonies ceased," he writes, "itimmediately passed to the Union."' 48 Sutherland further maintains that,
"[a]s a member of the family of nations," the United States assumed the
full "right and power of the other members of the international fam-
ily.",4 9 Otherwise, the United States would not be completely sovereign.
40. Lord Frederick North, Prime Minister of George III at the time of the War of Inde-
pendence, was seen by many Englishmen and Americans alike as subverting the British Con-
stitution with the aim of achieving royal absolutism. S. MORRISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 198-99 (1965).
41. "Mr. Justice Sutherland, when called upon to decide the issue [in Curtiss-Wright] sim-
ply quoted his earlier writings-apparently with little de novo research." Levitan, The Foreign
Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 478 n. 30
(1946).
42. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
43. Id. at 311-13.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 314.
46. Id. at 315.
47. Id. at 315-16.
48. Id. at 317.
49. Id. at 318.
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Sutherland then introduces the "sole organ" quote from Marshall,
with no reference to its limiting context, and follows by quoting a para-
graph from an 1816 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report to the
effect that the "President is the constitutional representative of the
United States with regard to foreign nations."50 He then draws these
elements into the following climax:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an
authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but
with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power
of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations-a power which does not require as a basis for its
exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other govern-
mental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provi-
sions of the Constitution.51
The first thing to be said about this breathtaking exegesis concerning
"plenary powers" is that it is the sheerest of dicta. Curtiss-Wright is
demonstrably not a plenary powers case. A "plenary" presidential power
is one that is not susceptible to congressional limitation: plenary power
refers to the exclusive presidential power to act without regard to con-
gressional action.5 2 What plenary power did President Roosevelt exer-
cise under the facts of Curtiss-Wright? It is emphatically the task of
Congress to legislate.5 3 At a minimum, this includes the power to enact
statutes imposing criminal penalties. One wonders what Sutherland had
in mind, therefore, when he announced that "we are here dealing" not
with statutory power alone, but with statutory power "plus the very deli-
cate, plenary and exclusive power of the President ... which does not
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress. .... -54 Does Suth-
erland seriously mean to suggest that the President could have imposed
criminal penalties on Curtiss-Wright without any statutory basis? Can
he truly mean that, in the absence of any trace of congressional authori-
zation, the Executive could somehow have fined or jailed the defendants?
Suppose under the facts of this case that Congress had taken a contrary
position, and, instead of prohibiting the arms sales in question, had af-
firmatively permitted them. If "[w]e are here dealing" with a plenary
power, as Sutherland says, then the President could, by fiat, criminalize
arms sales even over Congress' statutory opposition, and prosecute viola-
50. Id. at 319.
51. Id. at 320.
52. "Plenary" has been defined as "full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1313 (4th ed. 1968).
53. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
54. Curtiss- Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
Vol. 13:5, 1988
Presidential Foreign Affairs Power
tors. Perhaps Sutherland meant for this impressionistic essay to be read
less rigorously. Perhaps by "here" he does not mean "here in this case,"
but rather "here" in these generalized flights of fancy about the manifold
delicacies of plenary power. A little precision would have gone a long
way. In any event, one is compelled to conclude that the discussion of
plenary power has no place in the Curtiss-Wright case since the posture
of Congress was support for the President, not opposition.
Sutherland's opinion is a muddled law review article wedged with con-
siderable difficulty between the pages of the United States Reports. That
a nation enjoys certain prerogatives under international law logically says
nothing about which branches of its government, under its domestic law,
are accorded the power to exercise them. From the time of the Magna
Carta, the history of constitutionalism is in no small part the history of
the domestic control and allocation of sovereign prerogatives.5 5 It is the
history of rulers accepting limitations upon their sovereign prerogatives
at the behest, and at times under the duress, of their people.5 6 The
United States surely has the right, as a sovereign member of the interna-
tional community, to impose an exorbitant, discriminatory tax on all tea
entering Boston harbor and to eliminate Boston's representation in Con-
gress-to impose taxation without representation. The existence of that
international prerogative, however, hardly means that the federal govern-
ment, much less the President acting alone, has the constitutional au-
thority to exercise it. The answer depends not upon international law,
but upon the U.S. Constitution.
What about the limitations in the Constitution? Sutherland professes
to believe that presidential powers deriving from "external sovereignty"
must still be exercised "in subordination to the applicable provisions of
the Constitution. ' 57 But it is hard to see why that follows. Indeed, it
seems fundamentally inconsistent with the whole theory. There is no
logical reason why a power flowing from a source that transcends the
Constitution should be subject to the prohibitions and limitations pre-
scribed by the Constitution. Such a power should be immune from mere
constitutional limits, such as those guaranteeing freedom of the press,
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and outlawing cruel and
unusual punishment. Properly understood, Sutherland's theory thus
dangerously undermines cherished freedoms safeguarded in the Bill of
55. See generally C. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, ANCIENT AND MODERN 22
(1947) ("[T]he most ancient, the most persistent, and the most lasting of the essentials of true
constitutionalism still remains what it has been almost from the beginning, the limitation of
government by law.").
56. Id.
57. Curtiss- Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
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Rights. The precedent, as Justice Jackson wrote in reference to another
such decision, "lies around like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of
any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need." 58
Curiously, Sutherland's theory is easily flipped on its head. The theory
might just as easily be seen as requiring the application of restrictions
inherent in external sovereignty to the federal government. If the powers
common to all sovereign states under international law become powers of
the federal government, why should not the limitations imposed by sov-
ereignty also apply domestically to the federal government? If sovereign
states, for example, are precluded by international law from waging ag-
gressive war, that prohibition should also be seen as applicable, domesti-
cally, to the exercise of presidential power. If, as Sutherland suggests in
Curtiss-Wright, international law permits the United States to "expel un-
desirable aliens," 59 why should it not be regarded as prohibiting their
torture or prolonged, arbitrary detention?
Sutherland offers no explanation. Nor does he explain how powers
incident to sovereignty happened to end up exclusively at 1600 Penn-
sylvania Avenue. Even if the federal government is somehow the benefi-
ciary of powers bestowed by international law, why would Congress be
prevented from partaking in the exercise of at least some of those pow-
ers? This question is particularly apt since, as Sutherland himself notes,
a number of those powers, such as the power to declare war, are ex-
pressly conferred by the Constitution upon Congress rather than upon
the Executive. Did the Framers not possess the right to allocate the pow-
ers of sovereignty as they wished?
It does not do to say that such powers devolved upon the Executive
because the Executive is the United States' representative to the commu-
nity of nations. Aside from begging the question, the argument mistakes
policy communication for policy formulation. Few would now quarrel
with Sutherland's assertion that "the President alone has the power to
speak or listen as a representative of the nation."'60 But the power to say
what? The power to say that the United States will raise protectionist
tariffs against foreign imports? The power to promise allies, in response
to an international crisis, that 18-year-olds will be drafted into the armed
forces? The power to say that the United States will wage war against
Nicaragua if Honduras agrees to stage a provocation? Of course not.
These powers, and many others, are allocated among the branches of
58. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
59. 299 U.S. at 318.
60. Id. at 319.
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government by the Constitution, 61 and policies concerning such matters
must be made in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. The Presi-
dent may execute some of these policies with relative autonomy;62 in pur-
suing others he may be closely constrained by specific congressional
authorization.6 3 The point is that the President's power to act as the
"sole organ" or "representative of the United States" in communicating
with foreign countries does not allow him to formulate all foreign policy
by himself. When the Foreign Relations Committee in 18166 referred to
the President's sole power to communicate, it was not suggesting that he
retained the prerogative powers of George III. This means, in our day,
that the President was clearly limited as to where, with whom, and about
what he could send Oliver North to negotiate. Could he, for example,
send North's successor to negotiate with a terrorist leader concerning the
assassination of a political opponent? Of course not.
Sutherland gives two fairly familiar reasons for delegating broad for-
eign policy powers to the President. The first is avoiding international
embarrassment. "[E]mbarrassment-perhaps serious embarrassment-
is to be avoided in the maintenance of our international relations," Suth-
erland writes. 65 This is achieved by according the President "a degree of
discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be
admissible were domestic affairs alone involved." 66
Yet is it politically or constitutionally desirable for the President to
escape embarrassment for pursuing policies proscribed by Congress as
foolish or halted by the courts as illegal? In international law, as well as
in these frequently non-justiciable stretches of constitutional terrain, em-
barrassment is the principal, and sometimes the only, sanction that the
law can impose. It often is the central means of maintaining the integrity
of the legal system, of preserving the rule of law. To eliminate embar-
rassment is to eliminate the rule of law. A President who violates the law
should be embarrassed. And if presidential embarrassment over illegality
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (congressional power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations); id. at cl. 12 (congressional power to raise and support armies); id. at cl. II (congres-
sional power to declare war).
62. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) (upholding Lincoln's blockade of
seceding southern states' ports). Few would deny the President the broadest discretion to
direct military action under Article II, § 2 of the Constitution following a congressional decla-
ration of war.
63. The recent history of congressional tailoring of the President's authority to negotiate
international trade agreements provides a dynamic example. See Koh, The Legal Markets of
International Trade: A Perspective on the Proposed United States-Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 193, 201-10 (1987).
64. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
65. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
66. Id.
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affects the "maintenance of our international relations," then the Consti-
tution is operating as it should.
Sutherland advances a second reason for positing broad presidential
powers: the institutional attributes of the President. "[H]e, not Con-
gress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail
in foreign countries," Sutherland writes. "He has his confidential
sources of information. He hag-his agents in the form of diplomatic, con-
sular and other officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by
them may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it produc-
tive of harmful results."'67
Now, no one can dispute that "confidential sources of information"
pose a tremendous advantage in a wide gamut of diplomatic activity,
ranging from treaty-making and negotiations to covert action and war.
But why are these the President's sources? Why are they "his" agents?
The officers of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and other entities of the intelli-
gence community are employees of the government of the United States;
they are not the personal minions of the individual who happens to be
sitting in the Oval Office. They are paid by the United States Treasury.
Their intelligence "take" is the property of the U.S. government, and not
exclusively of the President. It begs the question to assert, as Sutherland
does, that only the President has access to their work product. It would
be peculiar indeed should Congress be entrusted with the constitutional
responsibility of making laws while at the same time being constitution-
ally denied the information indispensable for determining the need for
legislation.
Sutherland's cursory discussion of the advantages of executive secrecy
is similarly circular. It assumes that the Executive, but not Congress,
can be trusted with classified intelligence. Yet to this day no one has
presented empirical data establishing a greater likelihood of "leaks" by
Congress than by the Executive. 68
Sutherland completely ignores the functional attributes that commend
Congress as a foreign policy decision-maker. A policy normally cannot
be sustained for any significant period without broad public support. If
Congress cannot be persuaded to support a policy, neither, probably, can
the public. Congress acts as the public's representative. It brings to for-
eign policy-making the nation's diversity of views. Executive officials are
67. Id.
68. See Ornstein, North Errs on Leaks by Congress, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1987, at A35, col.
6 (citing Sen. Inouye's statement that more leaks derive from the "Presidential end of Penn-
sylvania Avenue than the Congressional end").
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normally chosen for their support of the administration's policies; "6no"
men quickly become former executive officials. In Congress, in sharp
contrast, virtually every significant opinion on foreign policy issues is
usually represented. Such diversity of views is a mechanism for avoiding
error and achieving consensus. The greater the number of viewpoints
heard, the greater the likelihood that the resultant policy will reflect ac-
curately the common interests of the whole.
Diversity of viewpoints in foreign policy decision-making is equally
useful as an end in itself: it gives members of the public a sense that their
viewpoints have been heard and considered. Diversity is thus crucial for
purposes of legitimacy. When the range of opinion voiced in the deci-
sion-making process is seen by the public as overly narrow, its legitimacy
suffers. A case in point is the Reagan Administration's diversion of
funds from Iranian arms sales to the Nicaraguan contras. A decision-
making process removed from the full panoply of public, or at least con-
gressional, opinion easily falls prey to the peculiar distortions of "group-
think," a process that causes the myopia of the quick fix to be mistaken
for the insight of statesmanship.
These are, then, in broad outline, two widely divergent approaches to
the question of presidential foreign relations power.. Which has
prevailed?
In 1952, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 69 presented the
Supreme Court with a stark choice. At the height of the Korean War, a
nationwide strike broke out against the steel industry. According to the
Youngstown court:
The indispensability of steel as a component of substantially all weapons
and other war materials led the President to believe that the proposed work
stoppage would immediately jeopardize our national defense and that gov-
ernmental seizure of the steel mills was necessary in order to assure the
continued availability of steel.70
President Harry S Truman consequently issued an executive order di-
recting the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the mills
and keep them running, arguing that the President had "inherent power"
to do so. The steel companies objected, complaining in court that the
seizure was authorized neither by the Constitution nor by statute.
Congress had never statutorily authorized the seizure. It had enacted
three statutes providing for governmental seizure of the mills in certain
specifically prescribed situations, but the Administration never claimed
69. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
70. Id. at 583.
Yale Journal of International Law Vol. 13:5, 1988
any of those conditions had existed prior to its action. More important,
Congress had in fact considered, and rejected, authorization for the sort
of seizure Truman actually ordered. 71
Justice Hugo Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The President,
Black wrote, had engaged in law-making, a task assigned by the Consti-
tution to Congress. 72 The seizure was therefore unlawful, since the
"President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an
act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."'73  Recall that it had
been sixteen short years before, as the clouds of a greater war loomed,
that Justice Sutherland had written of "the very delicate, plenary and
exclusive power of the President." 74 Had it so wished, the Court in 1952
might well have relied upon Curtiss-Wright, holding the seizure valid as
an executive prerogative incident to "external sovereignty." Yet the
Court never considered Sutherland's theory.
Notwithstanding the elegant simplicity of Black's opinion, the Youngs-
town case is remembered mostly for the concurring opinion of Justice
71. Justice Frankfurter described the consideration of those amendments at some length:
Congress in 1947 was again called upon to consider whether governmental seizure should
be used to avoid serious industrial shutdowns. Congress decided against conferring such
power generally and in advance, without special congressional enactment to meet each
particular need.... No room for doubt remains that the proponents as well as the oppo-
nents of the bill which became the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 clearly
understood that as a result of that legislation the only recourse for preventing a shutdown
in any basic industry, after failure of mediation, was Congress .... [N]othing can be
plainer than that Congress made a conscious choice of policy in a field full of perplexity
and peculiarly within legislative responsibility for choice. In formulating legislation for
dealing with industrial conflicts, Congress could not more clearly and emphatically have
withheld authority than it did in 1947. Perhaps as much so as is true of any piece of
modern legislation, Congress acted with full consciousness of what it was doing and in the
light of much recent history. Previous seizure legislation had subjected the powers
granted to the President to restrictions of varying degrees of stringency. Instead of giving
him even limited powers, Congress in 1947 deemed it wise to require the President, upon
failure of attempts to reach a voluntary settlement, to report to Congress if he deemed the
power of seizure a needed shot for his locker. The President could not ignore the specific
limitations of prior seizure statutes. No more could he act in disregard of the limitation
put upon seizure by the 1947 Act.
It cannot be contended that the President would have had power to issue this order had
Congress explicitly negated such authority in formal legislation. Congress has expressed
its will to withhold this power from the President as though it had said so in so many
words. The authoritatively expressed purpose of Congress to disallow such power to the
President and to require him, when in his mind the occasion arose for such a seizure, to
put the matter to Congress and ask for specific authority from it, could not be more
decisive if it had been written into §§ 206-210 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947.
Id. at 598-602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
72. Id. at 585, 587-89.
73. Id. at 585.
74. Curtiss- Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
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Robert Jackson.75 In reasoning strikingly reminiscent of Marshall's in
Little, Jackson wrote that "[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctu-
ate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Con-
gress."' 76 He continued:
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or im-
plied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers
of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential con-
trol in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the
subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive
must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium
established by our constitutional system.77
The opinion is thus notable for its unwillingness to decide the case by
reference to "inherent" presidential power, and in the weight it accords
congressional will.78 It remained for a former Jackson clerk, Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist, to give Jackson's concurrence the status of law. In
Dames & Moore v. Regan,79 Rehnquist applied Jackson's test to hold that
the Iranian hostage settlement agreement made by President Jimmy
Carter had been authorized by Congress. 80 In so doing, Rehnquist wrote
that Jackson's opinion "brings together as much combination of analysis
and common sense as there is in this area."' 81 Rehnquist then quoted
from Jackson a passage that, today, is as significant as it is timely. He
said: "The example of such unlimited executive power that must have
most impressed the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George
III, and the description of its evils in the Declaration of Independence
leads me to doubt that they were creating their new Executive in his
image." 82
These are wise words. The Constitution, no doubt, confounds both
America's friends and allies from time to time, who must with good
cause wonder: To whom do we listen, Congress or the President? Our
friends' task would surely be easier if our Founding Fathers had created
the President in the image of George III-if his word could not be ques-
tioned, if his act could not be challenged-if his power were not limited.
75. 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring); see, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 346 n.4 (I 1th ed. 1985).
76. 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
78. No opinion in Youngstown makes explicit reference to Curtiss-Wright's theory of "ex-
ternal sovereignty"-even though, if any act can be justified under Sutherland's theory, it
would seem to be one directed at maintaining "the national defense" in time of actual war.
79. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
80. Id. at 674.
81. Id. at 661.
82. Id. at 662.
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We pay a price for our system, in inefficiency at home and in misunder-
standing abroad.
But it is a price incurred deliberately for a benefit sought successfully.
No one explained the benefit of our system of divided authority better
than Justice Louis Brandeis:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of
1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevita-
ble friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among
three departments, to save the people from autocracy. 83
Arbitrary exercise of power, and the concomitant danger of autocracy,
pose an ever-present danger to democratic processes. In the United
States, the central safeguard against that danger is the cornerstone of the
Framers' political architecture: a structured equilibrium of power that
derives from setting ambition against ambition. 84 The teaching of Jus-
tices Marshall, Jackson, and Brandeis-the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court-is that there is seldom reason for upsetting that balance in the
realm of foreign policy-making. An executive order issued in the face of
congressional disapproval is presumptively invalid: it "cannot change
the nature of [a] transaction, or legalize an act which without those in-
structions would have been a plain trespass. '85
83. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926).
84. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (J. Madison) (Belknap Press ed. 1961) ("Ambi-
tion must be made to counteract ambition.").
85. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804).
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